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Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetics is characterised primarily as a realist ontological approach 
which is secondarily concerned with acts of consciousness. This approach leads to a stark contrast 
between spatiotemporal objects and literary objects. Ontologically, the former is autonomous, totally 
determined, and in possession of infinite attributes, whilst the latter is a heteronomous intentional 
object that has only limited determinations and infinitely many “spots of indeterminacy.” Although 
spots of indeterminacy are often discussed, the role they play in contrasting the real and literary object 
is not often disputed. Through a close reading of Ingarden’s ontological works and texts on aesthetics, 
this essay contests the purity of Ingarden’s ontological approach and the ensuing disparity between real 
and literary object, particularly on the question of spots of indeterminacy. I do this by demonstrating 
the following five theses: 1) Ingarden’s claim that the real object has an infinitude of properties belies an 
epistemology, and we should instead conclude that ontologically the real object’s properties are finite. 
2) Ingarden’s a priori argument that absent properties of real objects are ontologically determined is 
unsound. 3) The radical difference between the infinitude and finitude of givenness and absence of the 
real and the literary object ought to be relativised. 4) Indeterminacies within the novel are concretised 
in much the same way that absent properties of real objects are intended. 5) Literature makes claims 
that have a truth value that we can attribute to their author. 
Key words: Ingarden’s aesthetics, Ingarden’s ontology, real and literary objects, spots of indeterminacy, 
finitude and infinitude, truth in literature.
* My thanks to the two anonymous reviewers and Michela Summa for their helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper.
© HEATH WILLIAMS, 2020
704 HEATH WILLIAMS
АНАЛИЗ «РАДИКАЛЬНОГО» РАЗЛИЧИЯ  
МЕЖДУ РЕАЛЬНОСТЬЮ И ЛИТЕРАТУРОЙ
ХЭЙТ ВИЛЬЯМС






Феноменология эстетики Ингардена характеризуется, прежде всего, реалистичным онтоло-
гическим подходом, который вторичен по отношению к актам сознания. Этот подход приво-
дит к принципиальному различию между пространственно-временными и художественными 
объектами. Онтологически первый автономен, полностью детерминирован и обладает опре-
деленными атрибутами в то время, как последующий акт — гетерономный интенциональный 
объект, имеет лишь ограниченные определения и  бесконечно много «моментов неопреде-
ленности». Хотя моменты неопределенности часто обсуждаются, роль, которую они играют 
в противопоставлении реального и литературного объекта, зачастую не оспаривается. После 
скрупулезной работы с онтологическими работами Ингардена и его текстов по эстетике, ав-
тор этого эссе ставит под сомнение чистоту онтологического подхода Ингардена и вытекающее 
из этого несоответствие между реальным и литературным объектом, особенно в отношении 
«моментов неопределенности». Я обосновываю свою позицию, приводя следующие пять тези-
сов: 1) Утверждение Ингардена о том, что реальный объект обладает бесконечным количеством 
свойств, противоречит эпистемологии, и вместо этого мы должны заключить, что онтологиче-
ские свойства реального объекта конечны. 2) Априорный аргумент Ингардена по поводу того, 
что отсутствующие свойства реальных объектов онтологически детерминированы, не обосно-
ван. 3) Радикальное различие между бесконечностью и конечностью данности или отсутствия 
реального и литературного объектов должно быть релятивировано. 4) Неопределенности в ро-
мане конкретизируются примерно так же, как и отсутствующие свойства реальных объектов. 
5) В литературе выносятся истинностные утверждения, которые мы приписываем автору.
Ключевые слова: эстетика Ингардена, онтология Ингардена, реальный и литературный объек-
ты, моменты неопределенности, конечность и бесконечность, истина в литературе.
1. INTRODUCTION
The philosophical projects of Roman Ingarden and Edmund Husserl are often 
motivated by the same concern: what is it exactly that grounds the judgements con-
tained in the special sciences, both empirical and a priori (Husserl, 2001a; Ingarden, 
2013). For Husserl, the solution to this concern lay in an epistemological investiga-
tion that interrogated, like Kant, thinking’s capacity to acquire objects of knowledge; 
Husserl account emphasises that the objects of knowledge are the products of the 
constitutive activity of consciousness. His emphasis is therefore epistemological, i.e. 
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concerned firstly (but not exclusively) with acts of consciousness. For Ingarden, the 
difficulties in grounding knowledge arise because we do not yet have a clear idea of 
the types of possible objects that might exist, and the way they might bear properties 
and enter relations. What sort of “formal structures” of objects or processes are pos-
sible. Ingarden’s focus is therefore objectual. For him, the problems of grounding the 
sciences “all pertain to pure possibilities or the strictly necessary connections between 
merely possible moments, or between entire ensembles of such moments. I shall call 
them here ‘ontological’ problems” (Ingarden, 2013, 57–58). 
A fundamental difference between Ingarden and Husserl (and one that they were 
quite explicit in acknowledging), then, is the fundamental orientation of philosophy. 
Whereas Husserl repeatedly stressed that phenomenological analysis must proceed from 
an epistemological starting point and concentrate on analysing the constitutive activity 
of consciousness, Ingarden maintained that such analysis can be properly undertaken 
only after the completion of a preliminary ontological examination of the object whose 
constitution is to be analysed. (Mitscherling, 1997, 83)
For Ingarden, literary works compose a peculiar category of objectivity which 
he expended much effort analysing (Ingarden, 1973a, b). This essay interrogates and 
challenges Ingarden’s thesis that “spots of indeterminacy” “radically” and “fundamen-
tally” distinguish the literary from the real object (Ingarden, 1973b, 246, 248). I con-
tend that Ingarden’s desire to conduct epistemology only after he had carried out his 
ontological analysis leads him to an unjustified dogmatism concerning this radicality. 
This paper attempts to marry the rigour of philosophical analysis characteristic 
of ontology and epistemology with the liveliness of aesthetics and the phenomeno-
logical demand to closely analyse the matters at hand (or, “return to the things them-
selves,”) much like Ingarden himself and commentators such as Mitscherling (1997), 
and Thomasson (1999). Spots of indeterminacy are often discussed in the context of 
literary theory (Iser, 1978; Chrzanowska-Kluczewska, 2015), but in the philosophical 
context the radicality of Ingarden’s distinction between real and literary objects on the 
question of spots of indeterminacy is seen as relatively straightforward and is often 
presented without criticism (see for example Johansson, 2010, Uemura, 2019). My 
contribution points out the unnoticed fact that Ingarden actually fails to compare the 
real and the literary object purely along ontological lines and without incorporating 
an epistemological framework and, moreover, once the latter framework is employed, 
the fundamentality of the distinction between them is blurred. 
After briefly laying some critical groundwork via the provision of Ingarden’s ac-
count in the next mainly expository sections (§2.1-§2.3), this article quickly moves on 
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to critically argue for its major claims (§3-§7), the overall effect of which is a relativi-
sation (though not a collapse) of the distinction between the real and literary object. I 
shall conclude with a summary and some brief remarks on the consequences of these 
discussions. 
2.1. INGARDEN AND THE ONTOLOGY OF REAL-WORLD OBJECTS:  
THE DETERMINED
According to Ingarden’s ontology, real-world objects are “autonomous.” For an 
object to be autonomous, it’s attributes must be immanent ones that constitute the ob-
ject properly speaking: “Where this immanence is lacking, the respective entity can-
not be autonomous, and is for this very reason heteronomous” (Ingarden, 2013, 112). 
The immanence of properties presents the object and constitute it: “presents its very 
self ” as a “concrete unity” (Ingarden, 2016, 87). Relatedly, the qualities of autonomous 
objects (and thereby the objects themselves) are “concretised.” Ingarden explains that 
the “concretisation” of a quality entails “that existentially constrained form of a quality 
which it displays once it appears in some particular, individual mode of being” (In-
garden, 2013, 112). 
For Ingarden, concretion is synonymous with the notion of being determinate; 
indeed, one of the German words Ingarden uses for the qualities of real-world objects 
is „Bestimmtheiten“ whilst “determinate” is „bestimmt“; to be “determined” means very 
much just to be an immanent, particular, and individuated concrete attribute. And so, 
to say that all the attributes of a concrete object are ‘determined’ is almost analytically 
true; one could just as well say that all determinations are determined. The real object is 
“unequivocally, universally (i.e., in every respect) determined” (Ingarden, 1973b, 246).
Ingarden uses “determined” as an adjective denoting an existential situa-
tion, equivalent to “definite” or “particular,” and not as a success verb equivalent to 
“known.” To be determined is to be one way and not another and to not be further 
specifiable. Moreover, the real object exists without “being perceived or in some other 
way intended […]. Reality exists only insofar as it is something ‘in itself ’ ” (Ingarden, 
2013, 425–426). The same holds for determinateness: the real world, the objects in it, 
and their properties, “is a being completed at all times, and universally determined. 
There is no indeterminateness in the world” (Ingarden, 2013, 426). An autonomous 
object is “completely… exhaustively”, determined (Ingarden, 2016, 79); “universally 
(i.e., in every respect) determined” (Ingarden, 1973b, 246). Thus, all the properties of a 
real object are determined, regardless of whether they are known. And so, Ingarden’s 
account of the determinateness of spatiotemporal objects arises from an a priori on-
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tological analysis conducted prior to epistemological considerations, i.e. prior to con-
sideration of the manner or mode of givenness.
2.2. THE INFINITY OF DETERMINATE PROPERTIES
Yet, not every aspect of Ingarden’s analysis of real objects is divorced from an 
epistemological context. Even though, as will be shown, Husserl and Ingarden disa-
gree over the status of the determinateness of properties that remain unknown (and 
the independence of the real world from consciousness), Ingarden follows Husserl in 
claiming that the determinations of real objects that can be given to us and known 
via perception constitute an “infinite, i.e., inexhaustible manifold” (Ingarden, 1973b, 
247). As Husserl states, the “spatial object is without fail, more” (Husserl, 1977, 136). 
What might such claims amount to? Already to answer this we must shift into a mode 
of analysis which takes not only ontology into consideration (i.e., an analysis of the 
possible modes of being of possible objects) but also epistemology (i.e. an analysis of 
the way that objects are given to acts of consciousness). 
The essence of the object is inexhaustible because as I turn an object over or 
move around it, every presentation of a new side leads to the concealment of the 
current side, but I might then turn the object over again and re-view the side I had 
just concealed, and so on, ad infinitum. Thus, the cognition of real objects is always 
inadequate; one can never experience a presentation which views all sides contem-
poraneously. So, no matter how much of the object we have viewed, or how many 
perspectives we have taken on it, there is an infinite possible givenness’ of perceptual 
objects, “always other determinations still to be apprehended”1 (Ingarden, 1973b, 247). 
Thus, for Ingarden, the existential status of the properties of the real object is totally 
determined, while the number of potential properties that can be perceived is infinite. 
2.3. ON THE ONTOLOGY OF THE LITERARY OBJECT
Unlike the real object, the literary work of art is constituted by the intentional 
activity of consciousness, and 
every purely intentional entity is heteronomous, hence an entity which draws its being 
and its collective stock of attributes from the enactment of an intentional conscious ex-
perience, which in a specific integrated fashion is endowed with a content, and it would 
not exist at all without this enactment. (Ingarden, 2013, 113)
1 My italics. — H. W.
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More specifically, the literary work is a complex, founded entity that owes its 
existence to four ascending strata which constitute it: (1) linguistic sound-formations 
(individual word-sounds and higher-order word-sound formations). (2)  meaning 
units of various orders (e.g., word-meanings, sentence-meanings). (3)  schematized 
aspects and, finally, (4) represented objectivities (things, characters, situations, events 
in the novel) (Ingarden, 1973b). The intentional and thus heteronomous nature of the 
literary work of art arises because 
the represented objects [4] exist solely by virtue of the fact that they are projected — i.e., 
intended — by those units of meaning (‘contained in’ the words and sentences [2]) whose 
intentionality is, in turn, ultimately dependent upon the reader’s acts of consciousness. 
(Mitscherling, 1997, 136)
For the novel, “determinations” belong to the layers of objects (4) within the lit-
erary work. They are the analogue of properties of real objects and events. But they are 
constituted via assertoric sentences and nominal expressions (layer 2). If I write that 
“the dog is red,” we know there is a dog (which is not a cat) and that dog has the at-
tribute of being red (and so is definitely not black). For the intentional object, all “the 
material attributes appearing in its content […], are merely ‘allotted’ to it, ‘intended,’ 
but not ‘embodied’ [i.e. immanent] in it in the genuine sense” (Ingarden, 2016, 115). 
What makes the objects in the novel “schematic” (layer 3) is the fact that some of 
the features of the represented objectivities are “determined,” others not. Unlike the real 
world, the world of the novel is incomplete, like a blueprint. It contains “spots of inde-
terminacy” (Ingarden, 1973a, 50; 1973b, section 38; 2016, section 47b). This indetermi-
nacy arises from two factors. Firstly, language is often general but, as Ingarden notes, it 
“is always the ‘last,’ ‘lowest’ differences that determine [autonomous objects] materially” 
(Ingarden, 2013, 77). For example, a spatial object will not only be ‘red’ but also the most 
specifiable shade of red, yet the adjective “red” can be used generally without specifica-
tion. This means that even if I describe an object as “red” it has been partly determined 
(we know it is not black) but partly not (we don’t know which shade of red it is); it is 
up to the reader to decide exactly which shade of red via the process of intentional 
“concretisation” (Ingarden, 1973a, section 11). So even singular simple intentional acts 
which intend only one property might be indeterminate. Though it might be possible 
to describe in excruciating, technical detail some properties so they are completely de-
termined (I might describe an object as “Red Crayola colour P75126”), to do so in all, 
most, or even frequent occasions would take away from the aesthetic value of the novel.
Moreover, Ingarden is adamant that spots of indeterminacy remain ineliminable 
in principle, and this remains true even for complex founded intentional acts. Why is 
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this? Ingarden writes that the explicit “content of the straightforward act of meaning is 
always finite […], even when the act is closely interconnected with a multitude of acts 
that refer to the same intentional object” (Ingarden, 2016, 215). Put otherwise, even 
multiple detailed descriptions of an object list a finite number of features. 
Yet at the same time that content always contains intentive moments, which, in accord-
ance with their essence, in principle require an unbounded multitude of object-mo-
ments, hence would have to occur with them in the unity of one object in the event of 
their occurring in an autonomous object. (Ingarden, 2016, 215)
Put otherwise, intentional objects are intended as “concrete unity” which, just like 
their real-world counterparts, contain a potential infinity or “unbounded multitude” 
of properties. 
Thus, if we enrich a simple nominal expression with further predicates, adding 
“old, Chinese man” to “Chinese man,” the gap has still not been lessened between the 
finite determined and infinite potential of properties, much as listing the real num-
bers sequentially never brings one any closer to numerical infinity (Ingarden, 1973b, 
249). So, despite what Mitscherling suggests (1997), the indeterminacy of the novel 
not only arises because single acts cannot constitute an infinitely complex object. No 
matter how many properties we list and intend in a complex act, “the number of spots 
still left open […] is not at all diminished” (Ingarden, 2016, 217) because it “is impos-
sible to establish clearly and exhaustively the infinite multiplicity of determinacies of 
the individual objects portrayed in the work with a finite number of words or sentenc-
es” (Ingarden, 1973a, 51). Spots of indeterminacy in fact result from the “opposition 
between the finitude of content-moments in an intentional act of meaning […] and 
the infinitude of the determinations compelled by the established individuality of the 
object” (Ingarden, 2016, 217–218). These spots constitute a “horizon” of intended but 
unfilled meaning (Ingarden, 2016, 216) and the intentional object remains “always 
unfinished in terms of its Content, always just in the midst in being formed” (In-
garden, 2016, 219). 
Table 1. Axiomatic ontological differences that radically distinguish  
the real from the literary object
Type of  
object
Properties that  
are intended or meant




Real individual Infinite Infinite Determined
Literary individual Infinite Finite Indeterminate
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3.1. THE INFINITUDE OF PROPERTIES
As has already been indicated, we should not conclude from these discussions 
that Ingarden’s account of the difference between the real and the literary object is 
divorced from an epistemological context. On his own lights this is not entirely cor-
rect. Take the thesis that the properties of the real-world object are infinite. He states: 
“There are many properties in an individual object — and indeed, it would appear, 
infinitely many” (Ingarden, 2013, 77). As it just exists, prior to being known, the spa-
tiotemporal object surely has a great many properties. Think of all the properties of an 
object that might be revealed by an ongoing analysis; subjecting the object to all sorts 
of different conditions and listing properties like “soft,” “4 grams,” “soluble,” “acidic,” 
“composed of quarks,” etc. We might thus imagine all the primary, secondary, dispo-
sitional, and essential properties that any object possesses. The list of such properties 
which might emerge indeed appear endless. 
But, surely, it is not. Surely nothing could be more realistic than to admit that 
there is in fact a complete list of all the properties an object has. Even though the list of 
properties might change (its location, for example), ontologically speaking, at any giv-
en time an object has a finite number of features. Poli (Poli, 1998, 107) (citing [1975]) 
suggests that Ingarden recognises this finitude in Cognition of the Literary Work, but I 
have not been able to substantiate this reading, as in this work Ingarden still refers to 
“the infinite multiplicity of determinacies of the individual objects”2 (Ingarden, 1973a, 
51). Importantly, then, an account stating that the spatiotemporal object has “always 
other” properties which might unravel via ongoing perception relies on the notion 
of this finite number of properties being presented, and potentially re-presented, and 
re-presented, etc., to a knowing subject who cannot present them all at once. 
Ingarden does acknowledge the cognitive nature of the infinity of properties 
when he states that “an autonomous, individual entity cannot be exhausted by any sort 
of finite process of cognition that studies the object with regard to its individual proper-
ties”3 (Ingarden, 2016, 218). He admits the epistemological nature of this thesis when 
he says that the determinations of real objects are ontologically a “fused unity,” and 
it is only when perceived that they can be said to constitute an infinite, inexhaustible 
manifold (Ingarden, 1973b, 247). Thus, the notion that objects have infinitely many 
properties is one which only makes sense when correlated with a knowing subject. So, 
Ingarden states that the infinitude of properties is one axis which purportedly con-
stitutes the fundamentality of the difference between the real and the literary object 
2 My italics. — H. W. 
3 My italics. — H. W. 
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(Ingarden, 1973b, 248), yet, following his own line of thought, we cannot divorce this 
discussion from an epistemological context4. 
3.2. THE DETERMINATE BUT UNKNOWN PROPERTIES OF  
REAL-WORLD OBJECTS
Ingarden holds that determinacy is an essential structure of real objects, it “is part 
of the intuitively apprehendable essence of real objects, and it would be absurd to claim 
to the contrary” (Ingarden, 1973b, 246). He also makes the claim that the properties of 
real objects are determinate with modal force: real objects not only are determined but 
cannot and could not be indeterminate (Ingarden, 1973b, 246). It is therefore impossible 
that any property of a real object, whether known or unknown, given or ungiven, could 
be indeterminate. These claims are mutually implied. An ontological claim about an es-
sential feature of an object of a certain type correlates with the modal claim that it is im-
possible that there could be an object of that type which lacks that feature. For example, 
to claim that extension is an ontological feature of all real objects is to make the modal 
claim that it is impossible that a real object could fail to be extended. 
Essential features show in two ways. Firstly, positively speaking, every example 
of an individual which partakes of an essence, shows that essence when we expe-
rience that object. For example, every spatial object that is seen is extended. But of 
course, proof of an essential property is not inductively constituted by an nth number 
of examples, though it may be suggested by them and can be falsified by one coun-
terexample. Thus, additionally, a claim about an essential feature does not admit the 
possibility that the contrary could be the case. We cannot vary the object to produce 
a counterexample. As a further consequence, there arises the negative criterion of the 
impossibility of imagining a counterexample. It is this inability to imagine a counter-
example that underwrites the modal claim, off the back of the ontological structure.
There is an obvious problem of applying these criteria to the determinacy of un-
known properties. There is no sense in which we see that any example of a spatiotem-
poral object’s properties ‘partakes’ of being determinate when unknown, nor is there 
any possibility of falsifying them. Unknown determinate properties are reminiscent of 
the Kantian Ding an sich. There is not and never could be one single positive example 
of an unknown but determinate property. Unlike properties which are given, we have 
no positive cases to suggest this structure pertains. If we point to properties that are 
given as proof or indication, we are of course making an ontological claim (about the 
4 Yet, as we shall see in §4, the epistemological infinity of given properties can be challenged on a 
practical level.
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structure of a type of object) off the back of an epistemological thesis (i.e., one based 
on the way properties are given). The positive criterion could only be satisfied in the 
context of a metaphysics that accepts, perhaps, an inference to best explanation (or 
some other form of reasoning along those lines). Ingarden, however, relies on eidetic 
intuition for his claim.
Ingarden’s claim regarding the determinacy of ungiven properties seems more 
common-sensical than essential. There is no incoherence, contradiction, or absurdity 
to the idea that, once a property is no longer known, it ceases to be determinate. It 
is possible to imagine a spatial object whereby, once its aspects become hidden, they 
become indeterminate. This conceivability is more than a theoretical possibility. In-
garden notes that Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty might bear some relation to 
the thesis of spots of indeterminacy (Ingarden, 1973b, 249, footnote), but it does so as 
a comment on the purported determination of unobserved properties of real world 
objects. Quantum physics holds that quantum states are indeterminate until observed, 
quantum objects behave like both waves and particles, and that any quantum object 
can be in a state of superposition, and thus quite literally in two incommensurable 
states at once. Most importantly, all these effects cease to apply once states or objects 
become observed, suggesting that we cannot automatically assume that what is true of 
the observed carries over to the unobserved. Such arguments, I admit, need fleshing 
out and are prey to the claim that what holds at the ultra-micro level may not carry 
over to the phenomenal macro-level. The only important point for my discussion is 
that the indeterminacy of unobserved properties is conceivable, and so the negative 
criterion is not satisfied. Ingarden’s modal ontological a priori claim is false. 
Table 2. Comparison of my account and Ingarden’s thus far
Account of real objects Absent properties Properties that are given
Ingarden Determined a priori Epistemologically infinite
My account Not necessarily determined Ontologically finite
4. EPISTEMOLOGICAL VS. ONTOLOGICAL DETERMINACY
Unlike Ingarden, for Husserl, it is not merely being a lowest differentia that pro-
vides determinateness; the notion of determinateness is always also linked to intuitive 
givenness. Regarding intentional objects, Husserl and Ingarden agree, for example, 
that meaning remains abstract until the addition of intuition provides a higher de-
gree of determination in perception or imagination. It is at this point that intuition 
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“in fact gives complete determinateness” (Husserl, 2001b, 197). For Husserl, however, 
intuition is linked to determinateness even in the case of real objects too  — to be 
determined is to be known in fullness. The difference between the two on the issue 
of the determinateness of real objects can be understood as a difference in approach. 
For one, the notion of ‘determinate’ is a state of being, for the other it is an 
epistemic acquisition. For Husserl, because the perceptual object includes intentions 
directed towards aspects which are non-intuitive and not given, the perceptual object 
includes indeterminations. When we see an object, “only very little ‘of it’ is presented 
in ‘actual,’ ‘proper,’ perception” (Husserl, 1989, 185). Thus, the physical objects is not 
completely determined. In fact, perception “of something physical, in conformity with 
its essence, includes indeterminations” (Husserl, 1989, 185). Husserl goes on to say, 
however, that these indeterminates are included “as determinable”5 (Husserl, 1989, 
185). This analysis suggests that what separates the real from the literary is not the fact 
that absent properties are determinate, but that real objects possess indeterminates 
that are determinable. 
Table 3. Key difference between Ingarden and Husserl
Author Absent properties of spatiotemporal objects
Ingarden Determinate
Husserl Indeterminate but determinable
But we can go further than even Husserl does. When we take an epistemological 
perspective, the notion of absent properties of real-world objects present themselves 
as analogues for the spots of indeterminacy in the novel. I do not merely mean by this 
that the world contains many places of epistemological indeterminacy — properties 
we don’t know about for certain, such as the colour of the backside of the object in 
front of me right now. The situation for these indeterminates is indeed disanalogous 
to that of the novel, as in the actual world I can just move around the object and view 
its backside and make the indeterminate determinate. I cannot do so in the case of the 
literary object; there is no backside to see.
What is unchallenged by previous accounts of spots of indeterminacy is that 
other aspects of the real world are epistemologically indeterminate in a deeper sense. 
Johansson writes that “Nothing like [spots of indeterminacy] can be true of ordinary 
things and their property instances” (Johansson, 2010, 91). Yet, how many litres of 
5 My italics. — H. W. 
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water passed through the Suez Canal yesterday, for example, is deeply indeterminable, 
and not just in the way that the backside of the object in front of me is indeterminate. 
Not only do I not know about the Canal, it was entirely unobserved, and I never could 
find out the precise answer to this query. For another example, I may not see my 
friend Pierre between Monday night and Tuesday morning, and so not know what he 
did, and he may have been alone and then lose his memory, so it is forever impossible 
for anyone to find out what Pierre actually did. These sorts of deep indeterminacies 
are epistemologically analogous to the places of indeterminacy of the literary novel, as 
they are directly unknowable with any certainty. 
Ontologically speaking, in the case of Pierre and the volume of water in the 
Canal, something did indeed happen. The places of indeterminacy in the novel are not 
merely unknown and unknowable in the same way, they do not (and never did), in 
fact, exist. In a novel, we may read about a characters adventures on Monday, and then 
in the next chapter, about his adventures on Tuesday morning, but it makes no sense 
to say that something happened in between, even something that we may forever 
know not what. We, “as readers, not only do not know what happened in the stretches 
of time not portrayed, but the events are not determined at all; they are neither A nor 
not-A” (Ingarden, 1973a, 51). 
In practice, however, I may as well construct an answer as to what Pierre did on 
Monday night, and the only constraint will be that I provide a plausible one (see §5). 
The essential epistemological difference is that the indeterminate places in the novel 
never afford the possibility of being determined. But even though every indeterminacy 
in the real world may present such a possibility at some point, this point may have 
passed. Thus, Pierre’s actions may turn out to be indeterminable as a matter of fact, 
the novel’s spots of indeterminacy are indeterminable in principle. It is this less radical 
distinction that epistemically divides the ungiven properties of the real world from 
the spots of indeterminacy of the novel. 
Table 4. The epistemological difference between  
the absent properties of the real and literary object
Type of 
object
Epistemological status of  
the properties that are absent  
(my account)
Ontological status of  
the properties that are absent 
(Ingarden’s account)
Real Sometimes indeterminable as a matter of factSometimes determinable Determinate
Literary Indeterminable in principle Indeterminate
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5. INFINITUDE AND GIVENNESS
Further evidence for the relativisation of Ingarden’s so-called radical distinction 
between real-world and literary objects on the question of determinacy can be found 
in a closer examination of the extent to which real world objects are indeterminate6. 
There is much that is absent and not given to consciousness. For Ingarden, the inad-
equacy of real-world objects is established due to the infinite givenness of perceptual 
properties, but as I will show, in practice this givenness is finite and there are also an 
infinity of absences which is corollary to the degree of given properties. As we will see 
at the end of this section, Ingarden is aware of these structures but does not spell them 
out in detail nor draw out their consequences.
Part of this absence has already been hinted at. As I mentioned, the infinity of 
givenness stems from the fact that, as I turn an object over and present a new profile, 
I cover another, but I can always re-receive that covered profile by turning the object 
back over, and I can carry on in this fashion forever. Yet, of course, to get that profile 
back I must lose the perception of another, and so, an infinity of profiles will forever 
remain imperceptible to me at the same time. Due to the very infinite determinacy, the 
perceptual object is riddled with unavoidable absences and unknown indeterminacies 
too. Everything that is given implies something has been taken.
Husserl noted this interplay, because he always has in mind the correlation be-
tween the object and its mode of givenness to conscious acts. He stated that when 
we examine a series of perceptions of a material object we see that gain and loss are 
“balanced at every step: a new act has richer fullness in regard to certain properties, 
for whose sake it has lost fullness in regard to others”7 (Husserl, 2001b, 227-228). As 
highlighted, this loss is not ontological but an epistemological one (the real number 
of properties having not changed). Naturally, the dis-appearing profiles are not imme-
diately lost, as we hold them briefly in retention. However, as perception continues, 
they slip further and further into retention and lose more and more of their fullness, 
and with the presentation of every new profile we empty others further down the re-
tentional chain. Every perception is formed by a network of partially full and partially 
empty intentions. My point here is that the infinity of knowable and given properties 
of perceptual objects is relative to an infinity of absent properties. The real-world ob-
ject has an infinity of determinations to be known (in effect it has only an infinity of 
knowable properties; not known, and certainly not actual, properties), whilst the liter-
6 In what follows, I use the term “determined” not as coextensive with “real,” but with “known” or 
“given.” 
7 My italics. — H. W. 
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ary object has only a finite number of knowable properties, but both have an infinite 
number of unknown determinations.
It is worth stressing the above distinction between knowable and known prop-
erties. For Ingarden, the fact that the perceptual object can forever be known in other 
detail is a reason to consider it fuller of knowable determinacies, therefore placing it in 
greater contrast with the literary object, which is composed of only a finite number of 
knowable determinacies. As discussed though, the idea of an infinity of properties only 
makes sense if correlated with an act of perception. Given this framework, however, 
another essential feature of inadequately given real-world objects is that properties must 
be revealed one after another, sequentially, over time. In practice, due to the finite ex-
panse of time that every perception goes on for, in effect we only ever come to possess 
a finite number of known properties of their admittedly infinite knowable potentiality. 
Many if not most of the perceptions that occur in our ongoing dynamic experience of 
the spatial world are fleeting. Essentially, an infinitum of revelation could only ever be 
realised during an infinitely long perception, which is of course impossible. 
Ingarden notes that the finite nature of literary objects is inevitable because ob-
jectual spots of ontological indeterminacy are created through the limited intentional 
process of reading, but the determinacy of real objects is similarly finite due to the 
temporally limited nature of the act of perception, and the continual unfolding and 
concealment of properties drives an unsatisfiable demand for further examination. 
The fundamental difference is that the literary object meets a certain limit in principle 
at which point it cannot in fact ever be known anymore. However, in practice, this 
limit point is also met by every perception. Ingarden’s radical distinction thus, again, 
becomes relativised. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that Ingarden acknowledges the finite nature of 
perception and the infinity of absences when he states that because cognition “occurs 
in a finite manifold of actions, we can never know how a given real object is deter-
mined in every respect; the great majority of its properties is always concealed from 
us” (Ingarden, 1973b, 247). Yet, he immediately goes on to point out that “However, 
this does not mean that in itself [the real object] is not unequivocally, universally 
determined” (Ingarden, 1973b, 247). This may be the case, but whether we wish to 
consider the determinateness of properties independent from epistemology is a sepa-
rate issue (one discussed in the previous section). The axis that was under discussion 
was the finitude/infinitude of givenness/absence. In changing the topic at this point, 
Ingarden overlooks the fact that, because ontologically speaking there seems to be a 
finitude if not a singularity of properties, and, as he has just admitted, epistemologi-
cally speaking the number of properties that we know about the real object is finite 
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and the number of properties we do not know about is legion, then real objects fail to 
contrast strongly with literary ones along this particular axis. 
Table 5. Summary
Account Absent properties Given properties.
Ingarden.  
Real Objects Determined a priori
Ontologically/
epistemologically infinite
My account.  
Real Objects
Not determined a priori
Sometime epistemologically indeterminable 
as a matter of fact
Infinite
Ontologically finite and 




Ontologically indeterminate.  




6.1. THE ABSENT PROFILES OF THE REAL-WORLD OBJECT
What I also think is that the intending of the absent properties of the real and liter-
ary object share an important similarity that Ingarden fails to notice in his discussion of 
the process of the “concretisation” of the literary work. Regarding real world perception, 
every instance includes an “inauthentic” or apperceptive surplus: that dependant part of 
the intention which has no corresponding sensational data, what I am calling “absent” 
or “empty” properties. These empty profiles of real object are, as Byrne points out, not 
“imaginative intentions. Partial signitive intentions are rather, as moments of a perceptu-
al intention, simply directed perceptually at the occluded sides of the perceptual object” 
(Byrne, 2019). The significance of absent or empty profiles is that they merely intend per-
ceptual possibilities. They intend emptily what would happen were I to bring the absent 
profile to givenness, but this is not the same as constituting an expectation. I have empty 
intentions even if I never expect to reveal the occluded side of an object; empty intentions 
are revealed in the analysis of perceptual intentions as connected with perceptual profiles 
even in a hypostatised, purely static moment. Instead of empty intentions referring to de-
termined properties, “the series of possible future perceptions of, say, one side of a thing, 
leave open a range of different possible fulfilments” (Mulligan, 1995, 205). 
Not all possible fulfilments, however, are equal. Husserl makes a fundamental 
distinction between “pure” or “empty” possibilities and “real” or “motivated” possibili-
ties. His most well-known demonstration of this distinction comes in Ideas 1, where he 
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writes that it “is emptily possible for the desk I am writing on to turn out to have thirty 
legs; the possibility of the desk having four legs is motivated” (Husserl, 1983, 337). Thus, 
absent perceptual profiles are paradigmatic examples of motivated possibilities. Pure 
possibilities are arbitrary and unlikely (Husserl, 2005, 661); we are justified in think-
ing that real or motivated possibilities will probably come about in the future. Empty 
perceptual profiles, meanwhile, intentionally represent perceptual profiles that we find 
likely to be revealed, if an individual’s perceptual orientation were to change. Empty 
perceptual intentions are therefore indications, rather than expectations or imaginings, 
and are not pure but motivated perceptual possibilities (Mulligan, 1995, 193). 
6.2. WHAT IS ABSENT IN THE CASE OF THE LITERARY WORK
Ingarden’s account of spots of literary indeterminacy has some similarities and dis-
similarities with the above account of the absent profiles of perceptual objects. In at least 
some cases, we “overlook the places of indeterminacy as such and involuntarily fill many 
of them out with determinacies” (Ingarden, 1973a, 52). Although many places of indeter-
minacy remain totally unfilled and empty, sometimes the imagination spontaneously “‘fills 
out’ various places of indeterminacy with elements chosen from among many possible or 
permissible elements” (Ingarden, 1973a, 53). Ingarden goes on to state that the imagina-
tion is given “free rein” and “complements the objects with a series of new elements, so that 
they seem to be fully determined” (Ingarden, 1973a, 53). This “filling out” is analogous to 
empty intentions in function, in that it represents absent profiles, but is disanalogous in 
that does so by adding intuitive content (imaginative “phantasms” and “quasi” elements).
Ingarden does not consider indeterminate details that are either implied or 
consequences of places that are determinate as “proper” places of indeterminacy (In-
garden, 1973a, 243). If the novel depicts a human, we can assume she has the regu-
lar features of a human, even if the novel never states as much. Other indeterminate 
details present a variety of possibilities that we might fill in many ways that make 
no essential difference; the range of possibilities is very wide and unconstrained. For 
example, “the text of Shakespeare’s Hamlet does not indicate the height of the Danish 
prince or how his voice sounded or what position he assumed when he spoke with 
Yorick’s skull” (Ingarden, 1973a, 54). We may thus fill such characteristics in however 
we want within a broad scope (Ingarden, 1973b, 253).
However, in some cases the number of possibilities we may choose from are 
limited. Ingarden states that 
many places of indeterminacy, for instance those concerning the character of the person, 
his sensibility, the depth of his thought and of his emotionality, may not be filled out in 
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just any way because the filling-out of these places of indeterminacy is of great impor-
tance for the portrayed person. (Ingarden, 1973a, 54)
Some concretisations (“filling ins”) add or detract from the aesthetic value, oth-
ers can deviate from an author’s intentions. The reader ought to lend themselves “to 
the suggestions and directives proceeding from the work and in actualizing not just 
any aspects [she] chooses but rather those suggested by the work” (Ingarden, 1973a, 
57). Importantly, for Ingarden, constraints to the filling in process, when they exist, 
are internal to the world of the novel; concretisation should occur “within boundaries 
set by the work itself ” (Ingarden, 1973a, 51). 
However, even where one is given some direction by the novel as to the range of 
possibilities which might fill a spot of indeterminacy, 
the reader is not forced to choose a particular one of the possibilities predetermined 
by the representing states of affairs. The literary work does not necessarily have to be 
“consistent” or to be contained within the bounds of what is possible in the actual known 
world. (Ingarden, 1973b, 253)
He says elsewhere that the reader “is never completely bound by the work itself ” 
(Ingarden, 1973a, 57). In the process of concretisation, we can intentionally project 
what is improbable (Ingarden, 1973b, 253). These are critical points. For Ingarden, 
one need not fill in spots of indeterminacy in a fashion consistent with the world of 
the novel, or according to real world possibility. Due to the non-autonomous nature 
of intentional objects, I am always at liberty to exercise my freedom, and cannot be 
constrained by what may or may not be possible or likely both within the novel and 
especially in the real world. So, because these constraints are internal to the world of 
the novel, and the novel is a heteronomous object, part of the essence of the literary 
work is that these constraints are both “loose” (in that a variety of choices will always 
present themselves) and also “non-binding” (we may disregard the internal sugges-
tions we encounter, and in doing so we only contravene the sense of the novel). 
For example, I might claim that, during the periods of time in which Ron Weasley 
is not portrayed in the novels, he is in fact an underground spy working for Slytherin 
and a co-conspirator with Snape for resurrecting He Who Shall Not Be Named. The 
portrayed determinations which indirectly suggest otherwise could just be explained 
away by the necessity of presenting as a realistic double agent8. As this thesis concerns 
that which is in principle indeterminable, it is neither true nor false, neither A nor not 
8 Let us assume, merely for the sake of argument, that none of the novel’s determinations explicitly 
forbids this interpretation, i.e. that Rowling nowhere wrote “Ron Weasley was not a spy working for 
Slytherin…”. This would then, of course, constitutes a binding spot of determination. 
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A. It can never be said I am wrong (or right), because what Ron Weasley did when he 
was not being portrayed is indeterminable in principle, and it is this which grants me 
the freedom to interpret the novels this way. Ingarden’s point is that nothing short of 
making the indeterminate precisely determinate (or a direct consequence of what is de-
terminate) could constrain this interpretation, especially not real world probability. The 
most we may say is that this does not seem to be the sense of the novels. Ingarden’s thesis 
is that, although the reader of a literary text is loosely and non-bindingly constrained in 
this interpretation via the portrayed spots of determinacy concerning Ron’s character in 
the novel, nothing, really, stops me from holding this position.
I think Ingarden oversteps the mark here, because he underestimates the role 
that real-world possibility plays during imaginative representation. The imagination 
is, like the capacity to intend empty perceptual profiles, a possibility generator. As 
Husserl notes, an “experience ‘in’ phantasy is itself a possible experience” (Husserl, 
2005, 661). Ingarden is right that I undoubtedly have the capability or the capacity to 
concoct pure possibilities, and am afforded the opportunity to exercise this capacity 
because of the in principle indeterminability of the novel, but to say as much disre-
gards the fact that our imaginings are rarely completely pure and random. Normally, 
the imagination does not in effect operate in such an unconstrained fashion. Most 
imaginative acts are at least partially conditioned and shaped by reality, and thereby 
depict impure possibilities. 
Not only is it unlikely that we would imagine Ron this way but and this unlikeli-
hood arises because, though we are free to choose the content of imagined possibilities, 
we are not altogether free to imagine them in any light we choose. Not many of the 
readers of the Harry Potter novels imagined that Ron was a traitor, and most of them 
would agree that such an interpretation is implausible. What might such an assessment 
be based on? What Ingarden’s analysis does show is that this implausibility is not (in-
deed could not be) constituted by internal constraints. Although the process of filling 
might be conducted in a random fashion, we are never free to unshackle ourselves from 
the constraint of real-world possibility which colours a phantasy world, and such a con-
straint adds a normative dimension to the representation of indeterminacies. 
Because rooted in the real world, the relationship between represented possibil-
ity and notions like plausibility and likelihood are binding. The reason it is unlikely 
that Ron is a traitor is the same reason that it is unlikely that someone who exhibited 
Ron’s loyalty in real life would turn out to be a traitor: the fact that so few people who 
are loyal behave in an egregiously dishonest manner constitutes a generally harmo-
nious social style. Thus, the imagination at the base of the filling operations in the 
case of the novel is informed by probability calculations, and the process of filling in 
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is shaped by the general tendency of the imagination to fill in indeterminables with 
likely possibilities. 
In both the novel and the real world, this background of reliable styles informs 
the analogous ways we go about filling in or representing empty profiles. As stressed, 
the absent aspects of real objects given via empty intentions are not constituted as 
something which we expect to be given in the future. Individuals intend them whether 
there is any possibility of bringing them to givenness and thus do not strictly expect 
them. Yet, they are constrained. They are constrained, however, not by the fact that 
they are determinate but, as possibilities, by how strongly they are motivated. There 
are normative constraints on the degree of probability of our perceptual indications. 
Patterns will continue, what has come before will reoccur, if most desks have four legs, 
the one I am writing on probably will too, etc. We might represent to ourselves, per-
haps in a hallucination or delusion, that when I turn an object over, like a chair, it will 
have ten legs, or will have changed colour since I last saw it, etc. But we cannot moti-
vate these possibilities. So, the indeterminate spots of the real world are only loosely 
but bindingly constrained too, but by normativity, not determinateness. 
To say that the process of concretisation is open to pure fantasy as Ingarden does 
is to tell only half the story, and we cannot conclude that the literary world is therefore 
potentially open to pure possibility and unconstrained because it contains spots that are 
in principle indeterminable. The interpretability of the novel’s spots of indeterminacy is 
not a function of the possibility of bringing them to givenness, just as the motivated na-
ture of possibilities is not a function of our expectation that they will appear. The factors 
that constrain what is absent do not do so on the condition that what is absent might at 
some point be given but based on probability driven motivational relations.
The implication of this discussion is that we are not as free to reconstruct the in-
determinate spots of the literary novel as Ingarden makes out. Or at least, his account 
fails to mention some important addendums. Though he might be right that we are not 
tightly constrained by what we can purely possibly represent, what is likely, and thus con-
stitutes a motivated possibility, provides the loose yet binding constraint of plausibility, 
and this latter constraint forms a common structure for our experience of literary works.
6.3. DISCUSSION
The view just articulated should be distinguished from the possibility theory of 
fiction, which holds that characters are examples of possible but unactualized people; 
I just think that the concretising process of the representation of spots of indetermi-
nacy is constrained by being subject to motivated possibility. To give a definitive state-
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ment on the ontological status of literary objects is beyond the scope of the present 
essay, but generally I resonate with Thomasson’s sentiment that fictional characters 
are real cultural artefacts (Thomasson, 1999). 
Indeed, my view answers one of the major questions that the possibility theory can-
not. After outlining the indeterminacy of the literary world, Thomasson points out that 
we run into trouble immediately if we try to identify characters with possible people, for 
the features of a character left open by the story could be filled out in an infinite variety 
of ways by different possible people. Selecting any one as identical with a particular char-
acter seems hopelessly arbitrary. (Thomasson, 1999, 17, 18)
On my view, this arbitrariness is not only removed because of the dependence of the 
literary object on the intersubjective and ergo objectified cultural community that 
constitutes it, but the concretisation of spots of indeterminacy is also non-arbitrary 
due to the shared constraints on imaginative functioning. 
My claim is that the representation of the absent profiles of aesthetic objects 
is constrained by the same factors that constrain the representation of absent pro-
files of perceptual objects, i.e., the probability driven motivation relation. I agree with 
Płotka’s reading of Ingarden which maintains that the fictional object has “a double 
foundation […] in the actual (immanent) experiencing, and, on the other hand, in the 
real object, say, a novel or a drama” (Płotka, 2020, 17). My point is that, not only are 
literary objects constituted by their real world material foundation and their actualis-
ation within a cultural community (as Thomasson stresses), but what Ingarden fails to 
appreciate is that even the intrapsychic (or, immanent) act of imaginative intention and 
concretisation is often one which has motivational real-world possibility as a moment. 
Not only is the intentional object founded twice, but even the complex intentional act 
which founds it brings with it an anchor into the real world. The literary object is both 
intra- and extra-psychically embedded against the background of the real-world. 
Finally, what should be appreciated is how much the idea that literary objects 
are partly constituted or concretised against a background of real-world possibility in 
fact adds instead of detracts from the thesis of the worlds realism. As Bernard-Donals 
points out, one of the problems with Ingarden’s thesis that concretisation is a subjec-
tive operation constrained only by the world of the novel is that it seems to leave us 
in a predicament as to how intersubjective communication about the novel arises. If
decisions about reading […] are made differently from decisions about everyday recep-
tions of autonomous objects, two receivers of the same work cannot make a transition 
from the reception of some aesthetic object to agreement upon those receptions in terms 
of the everyday […]. What one is left with […] is an impasse between actual aesthet-
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ic understanding and the negotiation of that understanding between various subjects. 
(Bernard-Donals, 1994, 51–52)
In the case of spots of determinacy within the novel we can obviously just in-
tersubjectively consult the text. Yet, how is that we can realistically engage in dialogue 
about spots of indeterminacy (discussing, for example, about what drove Zenia to 
steal her friends’ partners in Atwood’s The Robber Bride) as we often do? Even in-
tra-subjectively, how is that we can wonder about a character, i.e., who Leonard was in 
Nolan’s screenplay of Momento, whether the Hulk could really defeat Captain Ameri-
ca, even what happened to Chiron and Kevin after the events depicted in In Moonlight 
Black Boys Look Blue. These thoughts only make sense against the admittedly loose 
yet binding constraints of real-world motivational relationships. These constraints 
must be shaped independently of our acts of consciousness, or else we would be in-
volved in a regressive, pointless soliloquy. That is to say, what constitutes a motivated 
possibility itself must arise from within our intersubjectively shared life experience of 
a world which is independent of consciousness if it is truly to exert a normative force 
on our acts of cognition, and it is only because we transpose this realistically formed 
framework into the novel that we can converse about spots of indeterminacy.
7. ARE THE THINGS CHARACTER’S SAY “TRUE,” 
AND CAN WE ATTRIBUTE THEM TO THE AUTHOR?
A similar and final example serves to relativise the distinction between the real 
world and the world of literature, this time a reply to Ingarden’s article On So-Called 
Truth in Literature (Ingarden, 1983). For Ingarden, the utterances characters make 
should only be considered in relation to the internal context of the literary work. When 
a character makes a statement, it “refers to the presented world […]. It is not permis-
sible to consider its truth or falsity in relation to any extra-artistic world, the real 
world especially” (Ingarden, 1983, 146). Ingarden wants to maintain that all assertoric 
sentences uttered by a character within a literary work are “quasi”-judgements, ones 
made with a certain half-heartedness and not in seriousness. This claim is repeated by 
Johansson, who states that fictional assertions “lay no claim to be true, and are there-
fore neither true nor false” (Johansson, 2010, 13). So, apparently, even when we find, 
a series of statements which resemble the sort we might find in a work of non-fiction, 
we ought not to take them as referring to reality. 
A theory of fictional truth is an important project. Moreover, it is indeed a mis-
take to assess the judgements that a character makes and attribute them to an author 
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without further ado. Some seeming truth claims contained within the literary work 
are there for dramatic effect, or they serve as a premise for the plot that adds a sense of 
realism, etc., but the author does not in all seriousness endorse such an idea. Ingarden 
explores many cases where we are often tempted to assign a truth value to a character’s 
claims and attribute them to the author but ought not to, and his analysis adroitly un-
covers various functions these propositions perform (Ingarden, 1983). 
However, Ingarden leaves no room for real truth in literature. I think that au-
thors have an artistic freedom to use the novel (or the poem) and the characters in it 
as a medium for conveying truths. Indeed, they sometimes do, and Ingarden misses 
some of the important roles that propositions which are supported by an author and 
purport to contain truths about the real-world play in literature. Thus, where both 
Johansson (Johansson, 2010, 13) and Ingarden hold that the following two options 
exhaust the possibility space: 1) factual assertions that are either true or false, 2) fic-
tional assertions that are neither strictly true nor false, I would add the third option, 
that 3) assertions made in fiction that are either true or false. 
Recall, for example, the way that Professor Pangloss, in Voltaire’s Candide 
(2006), continues to expound the metaphysical speculative philosophical claim that 
this is the best of all possible worlds, as the characters contemporaneously undergo 
horrific experiences that demonstrate the world’s imperfection. One can infer from 
this satire that Voltaire disagrees with the Leibnizian thesis. It is not only the plot of 
the novel but the characters which express Voltaire’s disdain for metaphysical phi-
losophy when they implore us that we should humbly “cultivate our garden” because 
“work […] is the only way to render life tolerable” (Voltaire, 2006, 59). The characters 
give voice to the moral of the story, a moral which Voltaire supports, and one which 
applies not only to the fictional world. 
Another clear example is John Galt’s infamous speech towards the end of Ayn 
Rand’s Atlas Shrugged (1957). This novel articulates Rand’s views concerning the in-
herent superiority of the capitalist class and their right to own private property, amass 
wealth, and control the means of production. The plot of the novel demonstrates what 
Rand thinks will happen when the class of innovators and natural born leaders of 
industry are stymied by a jealously motivated political bureaucracy that prevents the 
possession of intellectual property. The ruling class is forced to retreat from public 
life in order to create their own utopia which promptly brings about the collapse of 
modern civilisation. Not only can this novel be read as an extended parable of sorts, 
but Rand ends the narrative when Galt gives direct voice to some of Rand’s beliefs 
hitherto conveyed only by the plot of the novel. The claims Galt makes in this speech 
clearly do not only apply to the context of the novel. When Galt says: “Man’s mind is 
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his basic tool of survival” (Rand, 1957, 1056) one understands that this claim is made 
about the real world, and that Galt is voicing Rand’s opinion. 
These are examples where an author uses a fictional world as a type of thought 
experiment which serves to give vivid justification to a purportedly factual claim. One 
then has a character, such as Candide or Galt, give voice to the claim, which the author 
holds, that has been demonstrated by the thought experiment of the novel. Ingarden 
rightly emphasises that there is no reliable method for determining when we should 
make such an attribution (Ingarden, 1983, 146). But is reliability really the deciding 
factor when it comes to methods of literary criticism? I admit that sometimes we ought 
to be very careful about attributing views to an author, especially to those who spe-
cialise in irony, gleefully trapping naive readers into thinking they hold a perspective 
espoused by one of their characters that they in fact do not (i.e., Kierkegaard). Yet 
Ingarden is again going too far when he states that therefore we ought never to make 
such an attribution. Sometimes this attribution is relatively straightforward, and it is 
too intellectually timid to claim that one can never make it. 
Ingarden does allow that we can impute a position stated by a character to the 
author only if 
there is clear evidence for this either in the text of the work itself or in some extraneous 
evidence in the form of instructions from the author that he wished certain sentences in 
the work to be interpreted as his own views. (Ingarden, 1983, 164)
Yet, the connection between the views of the author and the character need not be 
explicitly formulated in the form of instructions. Ingarden underestimates our capacity to 
read between the lines. Even when we know nothing about an author like Ayn Rand, there 
is already often an automatic, ongoing transference and interchange between the views 
of imagined interlocutors and the author as we read the novel with its imagined world 
against the background of our own. When we begin to read Galt’s speech, for example, the 
sentences in the novel suddenly ‘punch through’ the fourth wall of the literary world into 
our own and we tacitly know the author is now communicating with us albeit indirectly. 
One might contend that the examples I have provide here (Rand, Voltaire) com-
prise examples where there is clear “evidence” in the text, and so perhaps Ingarden 
escapes the charges I put forward. However, he immediately goes on to say that it is 
precisely in these cases, when we do find such serious reflections in literature, we ought 
to recognise the novel as 
merely a pretext for the expression of certain views that should have been expressed in 
a proper and unambiguous way in a written work like a diary, a scientific treatise, or a 
political article, and not in a work of art. (Ingarden, 1983, 146)
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A little further on, Ingarden says something similar regarding lyrical poetry. 
He thinks that if someone wished to communicate true judgements, they would not 
employ emotionally infused imagistic verse form but “suitable arguments and justifi-
cations” (Ingarden, 1983, 155). Ingarden intimates that any example containing both 
quasi and real assertions should be classified as “borderline works […] more or less 
far removed from a pure literary work” (Ingarden, 1983, 156). However, this seems to 
be an artificial constraint on the essence of literature, and the examples I have given 
here prevent this line of argument. The simple fact is that some characters in some 
works of literature (as “purely” literary as they come) espouse factual claims that the 
author is making, and we know this, and this does not detract from literary value. 
Moreover, I think it false that “sentences uttered as judgments by a portrayed 
person […] claim to be true only within the framework of the portrayed world” (In-
garden, 1973a, 148) and that the ensuing purported truths “adds nothing to their 
character of being works of art” (Ingarden, 1973a, 147). Seeing as Rand’s novels voice 
her political views, we can judge the merits of Galt’s speech against the background 
of whether it is a true statement about the world we live in. We might say to ourselves 
“what a heap of nonsense,” and, in doing so, criticise the novel, Rand, and Galt. Con-
versely, we value novels that seem to provide us with some sort of deep insight into the 
nature of the real world, such as the works of Voltaire, or Orwell. Thus, considerations 
of truth and falsity in relation to the extra-artistic real world about what a fictional 
character says factor into the aesthetic experience and evaluations of the novel. Our 
judgements directly result from the transposition of the intentional state of affairs 
depicted by the sentences in the literary work through the literary world and over into 
the corresponding ‘ontic/existential’ state of affairs in the real world. The nature of 
this detour deserves a paper all of its own, but though we detour through the world 
of the novel, it is this transposition that Ingarden identifies as definitive of genuine 
judgements (Ingarden, 1973b, 161)9. 
8. CONCLUSION
In summary, it should not be thought that I am urging a collapse of the distinc-
tion between the real and literary. The first major portion of this article just demon-
strated that there are some axes, such as the intersection between the determined/
undetermined and the finite/infinite axes, whereby aspects of the real and the literary 
object sometimes occupy places along a continuum. The final two section showed that 
9 Ingarden operates with a correspondence theory of truth. It is beyond the scope of this essay to 
assess this theory.
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the literary object and the aesthetic experience is one which occurs within the real 
world and is enacted by real cognisors, and both the created world and the propo-
sitions it contains cannot and should not always be divorced from this background. 
That we need a conceptual distinction is uncontroversial, it is the nature of the 
distinction, its radicality or fundamentality, that I have contested. Real and literary 
objects are not antonymic, but neither do they thereby occupy the same place on this 
continuum. Generally speaking, I do not think the positions I have articulate lean to-
wards an idealism but further away from it. I would dub my view a phenomenological 
hyper-real theory, one which affirms the primacy of the things themselves as they are 
given but is happy to see the real in even the fictional. 
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